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THOMAS V ANCHORAGE TELEPHONE
UTILITY: ALASKA TACKLES GENDER-
BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, after weeks of negotiation, the Anchorage Telephone
Utility ("ATU") and the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers ("IBEW") reached a compromise on new pay increases for
employees of the telephone utility.' Electricians, draftsmen, and other
ATU plant force personnel received a forty-five percent pay raise,
while traffic, commercial, and clerical ("TCC") workers received a
thirty-five percent wage increase.2 Some female ATU employees re-
fused to consent to the agreement. The women alleged that the union
and the telephone utility had discriminated on the basis of gender.3
A class of female employees brought suit against the union and
the utility. These employees contended that it was illegal for a
predominantly male group (the plant forces) to receive a higher per-
centage wage increase than the predominantly female group (the TCC
forces). The trial court found no violation of the discrimination laws.4
Presently on appeal before the Alaska Supreme Court, Thomas v.
Anchorage Telephone Utility5 tests the plaintiffs' theories of discrimi-
nation and thrusts Alaska onto the cutting edge of employment dis-
crimination law.
This note argues that the plaintiffs in Anchorage Telephone Utility
should rely on Alaska's broad Human Rights Act rather than on fed-
eral Title VII to prove their claim of discrimination. This note also
contends that the TCC workers can establish a prima facie case of
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intentional sex discrimination based upon a theory of disparate treat-
ment despite the fact that their work is not comparable to the work of
the plant force personnel. This note argues, however, that Anchorage
Telephone Utility and the IBEW can successfully defend any charge
of intentional discrimination by proving that the marketplace dictated
the difference in pay raises. Finally, this note concludes that the plain-
tiffs fail to meet the requirements for disparate impact which is a the-
ory of discrimination that does not require intent.
First, this note explores the historical development of the anti-
discrimination laws of the United States and Alaska. Second, it exam-
ines the legal theories developed under federal law available to prove
gender-based wage discrimination. Third, the application of those fed-
eral theories to the Alaska employment discrimination law are ana-
lyzed. Finally, the facts in Anchorage Telephone Utility are examined
to discover the effect of the Alaska Human Rights Act on gender-
based wage discrimination.
II. HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Overview of Federal Statutes
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 is the backbone of fed-
eral employment discrimination law. Congress passed Title VII in
1964 following the racial riots and turmoil of the mid-1960's 7 At its
passage, there were many conflicting provisions which made the ulti-
mate usefulness of Title VII uncertain. Title VII provided blacks, His-
panics, and women with expanded economic opportunities, but strictly
limited government intrusion into business practices that could pro-
mote employment equality.8 When Congress empowered the Equal
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
7. In proposing Title VII to the Congress, President Kennedy stated:
[T]he result of continued Federal legislative inaction will be contin-
ued, if not increased, racial strife--causing the leadership on both
sides to pass from the hands of reasonable and responsible men to the
purveyors of hate and violence ....
... For these reasons, I am proposing that the Congress stay in
session this year until it has enacted ... the most responsible, reason-
able, and urgently needed solutions to this problem ....
This problem of unequal job opportunities must not be allowed
to grow, as the result of either recession or discrimination. I enlist
every employer, every labor union, and every agency of govern-
ment-whether affected directly by these measures or not-in the
task of seeing to it that no false lines are drawn in assuring equality of
the right and opportunity to make a decent living.
109 CONG. REC. 11,174, 11,175, 11,178 (1963).
8. A comparison of the following Title VII sections illustrates some of the con-
flicting provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (broadly prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation); id. § 2000e-2(j) (preferential treatment to minorities not required simply
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Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to oversee Title
VII, for example, it only authorized the EEOC to mediate disagree-
ments between employers and employees and not to enforce the Act.9
Thus, initially there was great uncertainty as to Title VII's effective-
ness in combating employment discrimination.
Despite this initial uncertainty, Title VII has successfully elimi-
nated many employment barriers for women and minorities. The judi-
ciary has interpreted Title VII's prohibitions against employment
discrimination very broadly, thereby making Title VII a powerful anti-
discrimination tool.10 In 1972, Congress strengthened Title VII by ex-
panding its coverage." Title VII also spawned other anti-discrimina-
tion laws. These laws include the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 12 passed in 1967, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.13 These
new laws protect from employment discrimination additional classes
of people, including the aged and the handicapped. 14
because the percentage of minorities in a workplace is not equivalent to the percentage
outside the workplace); id. § 2000e-2(h) (exempting seniority systems and ability tests
from Title VII prohibitions).
9. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1964) (amended 1972). Subsequently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 105 (1972), empowered the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to file a civil action in federal district court if
mediation failed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
10. See, e.g., Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986) (allowing an affirmative action consent decree); Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (prohibiting sexual harassment); Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (applying Title VII to partnership decisions);
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (holding that wage discrimi-
nation claims available even if work is unequal); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding a private affirmative action plan); Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (requiring that employer contribu-
tions to pension fund be sex-neutral); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(applying disparate impact to sex discrimination); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding that Title VII protects whites); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (rewarding seniority retroactively); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (awarding backpay for violations
under disparate impact); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(delineating requirements for prima facie case); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (creating disparate impact theory).
11. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
13. Id. §§ 701-796.
14. Other federal laws that outlaw various types of employment discrimination
include the following: the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982); the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
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B. History of Alaska Employment Discrimination Statutes
1. Human Rights Act. The history and development of Alaska
anti-discrimination law demonstrate a long-standing commitment to
the elimination of employment discrimination.' 5 Alaska recognized
and sought to prevent employment discrimination earlier than did the
federal government. 16 Alaska first banned discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, color, or national origin in 1953, eleven years before
Congress passed Title VII. 17 In 1960, Alaska expanded its law on dis-
crimination with the passage of an act prohibiting employment dis-
crimination on the basis of age.18 Congress waited seven years before
passing similar legislation. 19
15. Title VII does not preempt stricter state employment discrimination laws.
Nothing in this subehapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any
present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other
than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. The Supreme Court clarified section 2000e-7 in Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963), saying
that there is no federal preemption unless enforcement of the state law would frustrate
the aims of the federal law. Id. at 722. It is also unlikely that the more expansive
Alaska employment discrimination law is invalid as an unreasonable restraint on in-
terstate commerce. See Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, 423 F.
Supp. 552, 555 (D. Alaska 1976), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
16. Following the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). It was not until 1975, however, that the Supreme Court ap-
proved the use of section 1981 in employment discrimination suits against private
employers. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Section
1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). For a history of section 1981, see Developments in the Law-
Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29 (1980).
17. See Act of Mar. 9, 1953, ch. 18, 1953 Alaska Sess. Laws 64.
18. Act to Prohibit Unjust Discrimination in Employment Because of Age, ch.
10, 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws 7.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4:71
1987] GENDER-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION 75
In 1965, the Alaska Human Rights Act replaced Alaska's early
employment discrimination laws and became the sole state law prohib-
iting race, religion, national origin, and age discrimination in employ-
ment.20 In 1969, the Alaska legislature amended the Human Rights
Act to prohibit discrimination in employment based on physical hand-
icap or sex.21 Finally, the legislature amended the Human Rights Act
in 1975 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status,
changes in marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood.22
2. Equal Pay for Women Act. Alaska acted even more quickly to
prohibit wage discrimination based on gender than in banning employ-
ment discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. With
the passage of the Equal Pay for Women Act in 1949, the Alaska terri-
torial legislature prohibited discrimination between males and females
in the payment of wages for work of comparable character. 23 When
20. Human Rights Act, ch. 117, § 7, 1965 Alaska Sess. Laws 88, 92 (codified at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200-.300 (1986)). The Human Rights Act currently makes it
unlawful for:
(1) an employer to refuse employment to a person, or to bar a person
from employment, or to discriminate against a person in compensation or in
a term, condition, or privilege of employment because of the person's race,
religion, color or national origin, or because of the person's age, physical
handicap, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or
parenthood when the reasonable demands of the position do not require dis-
tinction on the basis of age, physical handicap, sex, marital status, changes in
marital status, pregnancy or parenthood.
(5) an employer to discriminate in the payment of wages as between
the sexes, or to employ a female in an occupation in this state at a salary or
wage rate less than that paid to a male employee for work of comparable
character or work in the same operation, business or type of work in the
same locality....
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a) (1986). Part of the original motivation for enacting the
Human Rights Act was to bring "Alaska's law 'into conformity' with federal civil
rights legislation." Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Constr. Camp Employees and Bartend-
ers Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942, 945 (Alaska 1976).
21. Act of May 22, 1969, ch. 119, § 4, 1969 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated).
The federal law protecting the handicapped from employment discrimination was
passed four years later. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 104, §§ 7-9, 1975 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated).
Congress amended Title VII in 1978 to protect pregnant women by defining discrimi-
nation on the basis of childbirth or pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex.
Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). This amendment overruled General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that Title VII did not protect
pregnant women. Federal law still does not proscribe discrimination on the basis of
marital status or parenthood.
23. Equal Pay for Women Act, ch. 29, 1949 Alaska Sess. Laws 80 (repealed
1980). The Act originally provided that:
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the Human Rights Act was passed, it included a provision, subsection
five, that closely resembled the Equal Pay for Women Act.2 4
For twenty years, however, the only type of sex discrimination
prohibited was the payment of unequal wages. Finally, in 1969 the
state legislature expanded the protection to women under the Human
Rights Act to include discrimination in hiring.25 In 1980, the legisla-
ture expanded the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act to make the
Equal Pay for Women Act largely duplicative 6 and then the legisla-
ture repealed the Equal Pay for Women Act.27 The text of the Equal
Pay for Women Act survives in subsection five of the Human Rights
Act.
C. Scope of Alaska's Anti-Discrimination Law
Although the Alaska courts have relied heavily upon federal pre-
cedent and theory to interpret the Alaska Human Rights Act,2 8 the
No employer shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as
between the sexes, or shall employ any female in any occupation in this Ter-
ritory at salary or wage rates less than the rates paid to male employees for
work of comparable character or work in [sic] same operations, business, or
type of work in the same locality.
Id. § 1, 1949 Alaska Sess. Laws at 80.
24. Human Rights Act, ch. 117, § 6, 1965 Alaska Sess. Laws 88, 90 (codified as
amended at ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (1986), quoted supra note 20).
25. Act of May 22, 1969, ch. 119, 1969 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated). A later
amendment forbad sex discrimination in public accommodation, property, and hous-
ing as well as in hiring. Act of May 6, 1972, ch. 42, § 4, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws
(unpaginated).
26. In Brown v. Wood, 575 P.2d 760, 767 n.8 (Alaska 1978), modified, 592 P.2d
1250 (Alaska 1979), the Alaska Supreme Court suggested that the Equal Pay for Wo-
men Act had a broader jurisdictional reach than the Human Rights Act, thus allowing
application of the Equal Pay for Women Act to non-profit educational institutions.
One year after Brown, the Alaska legislature subjected public educational institutions
to the Human Rights Act. Act of June 30, 1980, ch. 125, § 3, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws
(unpaginated). The legislature obviously wanted to increase the jurisdiction of the
Human Rights Act to that of the Equal Pay for Women Act.
27. Act of June 30, 1980, ch. 125, § 5, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated).
28. See Alaska USA Fed. Credit Union v. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d 804 (Alaska
1982); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d 487 (Alaska
1980); Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1979), cert. dis-
missed sub nom. Lumber, Prod. and Indus. Workers Local 2362 v. Wondzell, 444 U.S.
1040 (1980); Brown, 575 P.2d 760.
Furthermore, the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights relies on federal
precedent.
The [Alaska State Commission for Human Rights] considers instructive but
not binding relevant federal case law, statutes, regulations, and guidelines if
they do not limit the commission's obligation to construe [ALASKA STAT. §]
18.80 liberally.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 30.910(b) (January 1983).
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Alaska statute differs significantly from federal employment discrimi-
nation law in its scope, procedures, and remedies. The coverage of the
Human Rights Act is broader than the federal employment discrimi-
nation laws in several ways. 29 First, the Alaska law protects more
groups than do the federal laws. In addition to the categories of dis-
crimination prohibited under federal laws, the Alaska Human Rights
Act explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status
and parenthood.30 Second, Alaska law defines the membership of
some protected groups more broadly than does federal law. The fed-
eral Age Discrimination in Employment Act, for example, only pro-
tects people between the ages of forty and seventy;31 whereas, the
Alaska Human Rights Act has no such upper age limit for protec-
tion.32 Third, while Title VII only covers employers with more than
fifteen employees,33 the Alaska law applies to all employers regardless
of size. 34 Fourth, the Alaska law has an unusually broad reach be-
cause it prohibits discrimination against minorities living outside of
Alaska's borders. 35
In addition to the broad coverage of the Human Rights Act,
Alaska law provides additional procedures and remedies not available
29. See Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Alaska
1976) ("In view of the strong statement of purpose in enacting [ALASKA STAT. § ]
18.80, and its avowed determination to protect the civil rights of all Alaska citizens,
we believe that the legislature intended to put as many 'teeth' into this law as possi-
ble." (footnote omitted)).
30. Alaska prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national
origin, age, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy and parenthood.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1986), quoted supra note 20.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982).
32. Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552, 554
(D. Alaska 1976), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979). The definition of "physical
handicap" in the Alaska Human Rights Act also appears to be broader than the defi-
nition under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(11)
(1986) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). The applicability of other federal employment
discrimination laws is also contingent upon the employer's size or the receipt of fed-
eral funds. The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act applies only if an
employer has 20 or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982). The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 applies only if the employer accepts a government contract in excess of
$2,500. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982).
34. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(3) (1986).
35. Adams v. Pipeliners Union 798, 699 P.2d 343, 349-52 (Alaska 1985). In Ad-
ams, the union recruited most of its laborers from the South for work in Alaska. The
union discriminated against blacks in its hiring practices. Consequently, the Alaska
State Commission for Human Rights imposed a requirement that 2.2% of the new
jobs be offered to blacks. This quota was based on the percentage of blacks in the
Alaska population. The court ruled that imposition of such a low quota was an abuse
of discretion since it would not significantly help blacks in the South.
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under federal law. The Human Rights Act allows either party to re-
quest a jury trial.36 Moreover, as the agency charged with enforcing
the Human Rights Act, the Alaska State Commission for Human
Rights ("Commission") has the authority to hold administrative hear-
ings3 7 and order appropriate relief if it decides that discrimination has
occurred.38 Appropriate relief may include imposition of affirmative
action quotas on employers who have discriminated. 39 Furthermore,
upon receipt of any evidence of discrimination, the Commission may
on its own initiate an administrative hearing by filing a complaint.40
The Alaska law also can be considered more expansive than federal
law because the Alaska courts need not adopt into state law any future
retreats in federal anti-discrimination law by the United States
Supreme Court or Congress.41 Thus, the history of Alaska anti-dis-
crimination law shows that the Alaska legislature recognized relatively
early the problem of employment discrimination. The scope of Alaska
employment discrimination law shows that Alaska has taken a strong
stand against the evils of discrimination.
III. THEORIES TO PROVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Disparate Treatment Under Title VII
Under both federal and Alaska law, the two main analytical tools
to prove employment discrimination are disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact.4 2 Disparate treatment, the first analytical tool, is de-
fined as intentional discrimination against an individual on the basis of
race, sex, or religion.43 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,44 the
36. Hall v. Morozewych, 686 P.2d 708, 710 (Alaska 1984); Loomis Elec. Protec-
tion, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Alaska 1976).
37. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.120 (1986).
38. Id. § 18.80.130. If the Commission determines that discrimination occurred,
then it must issue an injunction against future discrimination. The Commission has
discretion to provide other types of relief. Adams, 699 P.2d at 351.
39. Adams, 699 P.2d at 349-50. The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has not
ruled whether hiring quotas violate the equal rights provision of the Alaska Constitu-
tion. Id. at 352 (Burke, J., concurring).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.100 (1986). The commission's complaint may even be
in the form of a class action. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Constr. Camp Employees and
Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942 (Alaska 1976).
41. See, e.g., Culp, New Employment Policy for the 1980's: Learning from the
Victories and Defeats of Twenty Years of Title VII, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 895 (1985)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has recently reduced many of the Title VII rights
available to blacks, Hispanics, and women).
42. Disparate impact will be discussed infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
43. Under ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1986), disparate treatment can also
result from intentional discrimination on the basis of physical handicap, age, marital
status, pregnancy, or parenthood. See supra note 20.
44. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Supreme Court set forth the requirements for establishing a prima fa-
cie case of disparate treatment under Title VII. The Court stated that
to make a prima facie case the plaintiff must show:
(1) that he belongs to a [protected class];
(2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applicants;
(3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.45
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant to give a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for re-
fusing to hire the plaintiff.46 According to Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine,47 the defendant in a Title VII action need
not prove the existence of a legitimate reason for the decision not to
hire the plaintiff, but only need articulate a legitimate reason for the
decision in order to overcome the plaintiff's prima facie case.48 Fi-
nally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward and rebut the
defendant's articulated reasons by showing that they are mere pretexts
or rationalizations. The plaintiff may succeed directly by persuading
the trier of fact that "a discriminatory reason more likely [than not]
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 49 Whichever ap-
proach is taken, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the
plaintiff50
B. Disparate Impact Under Title VII
In addition to disparate treatment, federal law recognizes dispa-
rate impact as a second way to prove employment discrimination.
Disparate impact is distinguished from disparate treatment in that dis-
parate impact does not require a showing of an intent to discriminate.
Disparate impact had its genesis in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.51 In
Griggs, the Supreme Court confronted the problem of a facially neu-
tral hiring practice-the requirement that a job applicant possess a
high school diploma-that disproportionately disqualified more blacks
45. Id. at 802. The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas also noted that this test
must be flexible to fit the particular facts of each case. Id. at 802 n.13.
46. A "legitimate reason" has been defined as one that rationally relates to an
employer's bona fide business concerns. Player, Defining "Legitimacy" in Disparate
Treatment Cases: Motivational Inferences as a Talisman for Analysis, 36 MERCER L.
REv. 855, 880-81 (1985).
47. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
48. Id. at 257-58.
49. Id. at 256.
50. Id. at 253.
51. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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than whites. Since there was no evidence that Duke Power imposed
the requirement to prevent the employment of blacks, there was no
issue of intent.52 The diploma requirement, however, significantly re-
stricted the access of blacks to jobs offered by Duke Power because
only twelve percent of black males in the state had a high school edu-
cation as opposed to thirty-four percent of white males.53 The
Supreme Court held that such a facially neutral requirement that dis-
proprotionately disadvantaged one protected class as opposed to an-
other was discriminatory unless it had "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."54
The Griggs Court gave two rationales for the disparate impact
doctrine. The first rationale was to prohibit defendants from hiding
their discriminatory intent behind employment tests that were not job-
related. 5 The second reason was to remove the barriers erected by
previous societal discrimination that might cause a disproportionately
large number of blacks to fail certain employment tests.5 6 Six years
later, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 57 the Supreme Court applied the Griggs
theory of disparate impact to sex discrimination. After Dothard, fed-
eral law was better able to address the problem of societal discrimina-
tion that had disadvantaged women.
A disparate impact claim involves three steps. First, the plaintiff
must prove that a particular employment practice has a disproportion-
ate impact upon a protected class.5 8 Second, the defendant must show
that the practice in question is job-related.5 9 Finally, if job-relatedness
52. Id. at 428-29. Duke Power, however, had openly discriminated against blacks
prior to the enactment of Title VII. Id. at 426-27.
53. Id. at 430 n.6.
54. Id. at 432.
55. Id. at 431.
56. Id. at 430. The Supreme Court declared that the purposes of Title VII are the
achievement of equal employment opportunity and the removal of past barriers to
such equality. Thus, the Griggs Court held that an employer cannot use policies that
"operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices,"
even if he has no intent to discriminate. Id. In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its statement in Griggs, declaring that "Griggs was rightly concerned
that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, re-
sulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and
invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives." McDonnell Doug-
las, 411 U.S. at 806.
57. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). In Dothard, a female applicant for a position as a cor-
rectional counselor challenged minimum height and weight requirements for prison
guards because the requirement barred more women than men.
58. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770
F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Disparate impact analysis is confined to cases that
challenge a specific, clearly delineated employment practice applied at a single point in
the job selection process." (citation omitted)).
59. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979).
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is shown, the plaintiff is given the opportunity to establish that other
alternative practices would serve the employer's interest without a
similar discriminatory effect. 60 Thus, the pivotal questions in dispa-
rate impact cases are the closeness of the relationship between the
challenged employment practice and the actual requirements of the
job, as well as the existence of practical alternatives to the challenged
practice. The disparate impact analysis set out in Griggs and Dothard
allows women and other protected groups to challenge discriminatory
employment practices without having to prove intent.
C. The Effect of the Equal Pay Act on Title VII Sex
Discrimination
The federal Equal Pay Act of 196361 only addresses the narrow
problem of gender-based wage discrimination. The Equal Pay Act
prohibits an employer from paying unequal wages to men and women
who do work of substantially "equal skill, effort, and responsibility.
62
To succeed in an action under the Act for unequal wages, a female
employee must show that she: (1) worked in the same establishment
as males,63 (2) received unequal pay, and (3) performed work "equal"
to that performed by males.64 The Equal Pay Act is limited by the
60. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). The Equal Pay Act provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate within any establishment in which such employees are em-
ployed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such
payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv)
a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection
shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce
the wage rate of any employee.
Id. § 206(d)(1).
62. The Equal Pay Act cannot be construed to require equal pay for comparable
work. In the debate over the Act, by floor amendment, the word "equal" was substi-
tuted for the word "comparable." 108 CONG. REc. 14,771 (1962). Representative
Goodell explained that use of the word "equal" rather than "comparable" meant that
the "jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, they would be very much alike
or closely related to each other." 109 CONG. REc. 9197 (1963).
63. See Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th
Cir. 1975).
64. Cf. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 203 n.24 (1974) (holding
that substantial equality in the nature of the work, not identicalness, is sufficient to
establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act); Schultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie
Prods., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding equal work when the one differing
task involved relatively little time or effort); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
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"equal work" requirement and cannot be used to challenge many in-
dustry-wide practices.
Title VII offers more hope than the Equal Pay Act for remedying
historical wage discrepancies between broad classes of workers. Until
1980, however, courts did not apply Title VII to sex-based wage dis-
crimination unless the work performed by women was equal to that
performed by men.6 5 Courts interpreted the Bennett Amendment, 66 a
last minute addition to Title VII, to require that the plaintiff show a
violation of the Equal Pay Act's "equal pay for equal work" standard
when alleging wage discrimination based on sex under Title VII. For
women claiming wage discrimination, this requirement severely lim-
ited Title VII's broad remedial powers.
Finally, in 1981, the Supreme Court ended this limitation on Title
VII wage discrimination cases. In County of Washington v. Gunther, 67
the Court held that the Bennett Amendment did not incorporate into
Title VII the "equal pay for equal work" requirement of the Equal Pay
Act.65 The Court in Gunther gave female plaintiffs the opportunity to
sue for wage discrimination even if they performed different work than
259, 266 (3d Cir.) (holding that female job is to be compared to the least different male
job, not the typical male job, for purposes of determining whether work is equal), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
65. See, eg., Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1977); Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, 511 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119-20 (10th Cir. 1971).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The Bennett Amendment declares: "It shall
not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensa-
tion paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is author-
ized by the [Equal Pay Act]." Id.
67. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
68. Id. at 168. The Supreme Court did maintain that the Bennett Amendment
incorporates the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. Id. at
170. These four defenses to an allegation of wage disparity are: (1) a seniority system;
(2) a merit system; (3) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of pro-
duction; and (4) a differential based on any other factor other than sex. See supra note
61.
But note that if the Bennett Amendment was only intended to incorporate the
Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses, then it accomplishes very little, since Title VII
already expressly contained the first three of these defenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1982). The fourth affirmative defense to the Equal Pay Act is different since it
was meant to "confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to
sex discrimination. Equal Pay Act litigation, therefore, has been structured to permit
employers to defend against charges of discrimination where their pay differentials are
based on a bona fide use of 'other factors other than sex.'" Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170
(citation omitted). The incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense may have an
effect on Title VII wage discrimination litigation. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
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men. As a result of Gunther, the requirements for a prima facie case
under the Equal Pay Act no longer restrict Title VII actions. 69
After Gunther, courts have used a modified McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine analysis in cases of intentional wage discrimination. The
main modification that some lower courts have adopted is that even if
the plaintiff's work is not equal, it still should be similar to that per-
formed by men.70 The rationale for this "similar work" requirement is
that the four requirements of McDonnell Douglas71 do "not eliminate
the most common, nondiscriminatory reason for wage disparity: dif-
ferences in the jobs' requirements of skill, effort, and responsibility." 72
The courts reason that a difference in the jobs and not an intent to
discriminate probably caused the difference in pay.7 3 Because the ma-
jority in Gunther did not decide the "precise contours of lawsuits chal-
lenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII," 4 the
requirements for proving sex-based wage discrimination under dispa-
rate impact are also very unclear.7 5 What remains important, how-
ever, is that Title VII can finally be used to attack gender-based wage
discrimination without a showing of equal work.
69. Note that the Bennett Amendment also does not incorporate the "single es-
tablishment" requirement of the Equal Pay Act, see supra note 63, into Title VII.
Marcoux v. Maine, 797 F.2d 1100, 1104 (1st Cir. 1986).
70. See, e.g., Beall v. Curtis, 603 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd without
published opinion, 778 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1985); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F.
Supp. 435, 444 (W.D. Wis. 1982); cf Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d
686, 700-01 (9th Cir.) (holding that even more than just similarity between jobs
needed to infer a discriminatory animus), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Plemer v.
Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that besides a similar-
ity in jobs, one needs to show a "transparently sex-biased system for wage
determination").
7 1. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
72. Briggs, 536 F. Supp. at 444.
73. Another modification is that the employer may rely on the four affirmative
defenses of the Equal Pay Act. See supra note 68. For these defenses, the burden of
proof is on the employer. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974);
cf. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that, in Title
VII suit alleging gender-based wage discrimination, the employer had the burden of
proving that the wage differential resulted from a "factor other than sex").
74. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 181.
75. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that Gunther confines sex-based wage discrimination for unequal work under
Title VII to the disparate treatment theory only); Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876 ("An em-
ployer cannot use a factor which causes a wage differential between male and female
employees [unless he proves he had] an acceptable business reason."); Note, Sex-
Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN.
L. REv. 1083 (1982) (stating that Gunther allows wage claims under disparate impact,
but not under comparable worth).
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IV. ALASKA'S APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE TREATMENT
AND DISPARATE IMPACT THEORIES
A. Disparate Treatment Under The Alaska Human Rights Act
1. Application of McDonnell Douglas to Alaska Employment Dis-
crimination Law. The first case in which the Alaska Supreme Court
applied the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test to the Alaska Human
Rights Act was Alaska State Commission for Human Rights v. Yellow
Cab.76 In 1975, Wendy Mayer went to the Fairbanks office of Yellow
Cab and asked for an application for the position of cab driver.77 An
employee of Yellow Cab told Mayer that he could not give her an
application because the company did not hire women cab drivers. The
employee also told her that if she still wanted to apply, she could only
see the manager at 5:00 a.m. the following day. Mayer made no fur-
ther attempts to apply formally for a position. 78
The question before the Alaska Supreme Court was whether
Mayer had established a prima facie case.79 The supreme court began
by explicitly adopting the McDonnell Douglas four-part test.8 0 Yellow
Cab conceded that Mayer was a member of a protected class which
established the first requirement of the prima facie case. The question
arose, however, whether Mayer had applied for the job within the
meaning of McDonnell Douglas. Since Mayer had been rebuffed in her
application attempt and since any further actions would clearly have
been futile, the supreme court determined that a formal application
was unnecessary. 81 After reaching this conclusion, the supreme court
found that the remaining McDonnell Douglas requirements were
met.82 The court then noted that Yellow Cab did not attempt to artic-
ulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action in order to rebut plain-
tiff's prima facie case.83 Therefore, Yellow Cab failed to meet its
simple burden of producing evidence under Burdine8 4 and was found
in violation of the Alaska Human Rights Act. The significance of Yel-
low Cab lies in the adoption and flexible application of the McDonnell
Douglas test to the Alaska Human Rights Act by the Alaska Supreme
Court.
76. 611 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1980).
77. Id. at 488.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 490. The McDonnell Douglas test is set forth supra note 45 and accom-
panying text.
81. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d at 491.
82. Id. at 491-92.
83. Id. at 492.
84. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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2. Alaska Defines the Intent Requirement for a Disparate Treat-
ment Case. Although Alaska remains committed to the use of the
McDonnell Douglas principles adopted in Yellow Cab, the recent case
of Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. Fridriksson85 raises questions
regarding the requirement of intent under the Alaska Human Rights
Act. 86 Fridriksson involved the application of a female employee of a
credit union for the position of branch manager. 87 Fridriksson had
been recommended for the position by the previous manager.8 8 When
her application was rejected and a male applicant was hired, she
brought suit before the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights.8 9
The Commission concluded that the credit union had discriminated
against Fridriksson, and the credit union appealed the decision to the
Alaska Supreme Court.
The Alaska Supreme Court found that Fridriksson had estab-
lished a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.90 The supreme court
then adopted the Burdine approach, which required the credit union
to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its decision. 91 The credit
union offered several reasons for not hiring Fridriksson, including the
cost of training her. The supreme court, however, concurred with the
declaration of the Commission that these "explanations were unwor-
thy of belief."'92
A problem for the supreme court in Fridriksson arose from the
prior finding of the Commission that the credit union's actions were
not "intentionally and willfully discriminatory, ' 93 but that "sex was a
85. 642 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1982).
86. For a fuller discussion of Alaska's struggle with the intent requirement in
disparate treatment cases, see Fossey, Employment Discrimination Law-Strand v. Pe-
tersburg Public School and Fridriksson v. Alaska USA Federal Credit Union: The
Supreme Court Charts an Uncertain Course, 1 ALASKA L. Rnv. 53 (1984).
87. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d at 805.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 806-08. The credit union argued that Fridriksson was not qualified for
the job because she lacked management experience. The Alaska Supreme Court held,
however, that the qualification element of the McDonnell Douglas test applied only to
objective criteria. Fridriksson met the only objective qualification for the job-a high
school diploma. The court determined that the question of whether the plaintiff was
unqualified due to subjective criteria such as personality or management experience
should be left for the employer to articulate and should not constitute an element of
the prima facie case. Id. at 807. For a discussion on whether Title VII requires that
the plaintiff show she is subjectively as well as objectively qualified to make a prima
facie case, see Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII
Litigation, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 553, 557-64 (1982).
91. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d at 808.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 809 n.7.
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factor in the decision not to promote [Fridriksson]." 94 Convinced that
discrimination had occurred, but faced with the Commission's seem-
ingly inconsistent findings, the majority of the court in Fridriksson
concluded that "[d]iscrimination need not be purposeful," but may be
simply an "accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about
females."95 The majority opinion suggested that actions based on ster-
eotypical assumptions about a protected class would be sufficient to
satisfy the intent requirement of disparate treatment.
In a special concurrence, Chief Justice Rabinowitz agreed with
the majority that an employer's decision need not be made in bad faith
or with a purposeful design to place women at a disadvantage. 96 Rabi-
nowitz emphasized, however, that the existence of a discriminatory
motive is critical for liability under disparate treatment and that a
court must find that gender was a factor in the decision. 97 Rabinowitz
also noted that the court could infer an intent to discriminate when
the defendant failed to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case as had
occurred in the case at bar. A reconciliation of the majority opinion
with the concurrence of Rabinowitz shows that Alaska law recognizes
an intent to discriminate if sex was a factor in the decision. 98
B. Disparate Impact Under the Alaska Human Rights Act
Surprisingly, the Alaska Supreme Court has never had the oppor-
tunity to decide a case using the powerful theory of disparate impact.99
94. Id. at 808.
95. Id. at 809 n.7 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment)). Goldfarb involved a challenge on due process and equal
protection grounds to differing requirements for widows and widowers for receipt of
social security survivors' benefits.
96. Id. at 809 n.2 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. This definition of "intent" should be contrasted to the federal definition. The
United States Supreme Court in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), held that, under the equal protection clause, discriminatory
"intent" means choosing "a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Note that the
definition of "intent" under Title VII is the same as that under equal protection analy-
sis. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986).
99. Disparate impact under Title VII has been used to challenge a variety of em-
ployer policies. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979)
(methadone users); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight
requirements); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (education require-
ments); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983) (head of house-
hold rule), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697
F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (jobs reserved for employee shareholders), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984); Hariss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980)
(maternity leave policy); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (English lan-
guage only rule), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595
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It appears that all Alaska cases to date have proceeded under dispa-
rate treatment) °° There is no indication, however, that disparate im-
pact analysis would be inapplicable to the Alaska Human Rights Act.
In fact, the history of Alaska's reliance on federal precedent'0 1 and
Alaska's desire to have a broad prohibition against discrimination 10 2
suggest that the Alaska Supreme Court would apply disparate impact
at least as broadly as do federal courts under Title VII.
C. Equal Pay Under the Alaska Human Rights Act
1. Alaska Wage Discrimination Law Is Not Limited by an Equal
Work Requirement. Alaska currently has no separate equivalent of
the federal Equal Pay Act.103 Subsection five of the Alaska Human
Rights Act contains the prohibition against discrimination in payment
of wages on the basis of gender.1 4 Unlike the federal Equal Pay Act,
subsection five does not require that a female plaintiff show exactly
"equal work" before she can challenge her pay as unequal. Instead,
subsection five prohibits unequal pay to women for work of the same
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (physical abilities), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Parson
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978) (experience re-
quirements), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (no-hiring-of-spouse rule), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978);
Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.) (immorality), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 917 (1977); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (arrest or
conviction records); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (excessive
garnishments); Asbestos Workers, Local 83 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir, 1969)
(pro-nepotism policies).
100. See, e.g., Adams v. Pipeliners Union 798, 699 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1985); Strand
v. Petersburg Pub. Schools, 659 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1983); Fridriksson, 642 P.2d 804;
Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1980);
Brown v. Wood, 575 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1978), modified, 592 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1979);
McLean v. State, 583 P.2d 867 (Alaska 1978); Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schae-
fer, 549 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1976). In Fridriksson, however, Chief Justice Rabinowitz
accused the majority of confusing the disparate treatment and impact theories and
incorrectly deciding Fridriksson under disparate treatment while using elements of
disparate impact. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d at 810 n.3 (Rabinowitz, C.J. concurring).
101. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
104. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (1986), quoted supra note 20.
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"comparable character" as men,10 5 a requirement that is probably
more broad than "equal work."' 10 6
Because of the Bennett Amendment, federal courts were initially
reluctant to use Title VII to attack sex-based wage discrimination
without a showing of equal work.10 7 Even though Gunther eventually
eliminated the equal work requirement, wage discrimination suits
under Title VII remain subject to the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative
defenses.10 8 The Human Rights Act, however, has no connection be-
tween the equal pay provision in subsection five and the broad general
prohibition against employment discrimination in subsection one. De-
fenses in an action under subsection one are not necessarily applicable
to an action under subsection five and vice versa. A plaintiff, for ex-
ample, may either sue under subsection five and show that the jobs are
comparable in their character, or sue under the general provisions of
subsection one and be subject to the "reasonable demands of the posi-
tion" defense. 10 9 The analysis of subsection one can also track Mc-
Donnell Douglas and Griggs while the analysis of subsection five can
follow that of the Equal Pay Act cases without any interaction be-
tween the two subsections."10
2. Alaska Wage Discrimination Law Allows a Defense that the De-
cision Was Not Based on Sex. The only Alaska Supreme Court case
105. The "comparable character" language dates back to the Alaska Equal Pay for
Women Act, which was first passed in 1949. Equal Pay for Women Act, ch. 29, § 1,
1949 Alaska Sess. Laws 80 (repealed 1980), quoted supra note 23. In 1980, the Equal
Pay for Women Act was repealed and the "comparable character" language was re-
tained exclusively in subsection five of the Human Rights Act. Act of June 30, 1980,
ch. 125, § 5, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated); see also supra notes 26-27 and
accompanying text.
106. See Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights ex rel. Bradley v. Alaska, No. D-
79-0724-188-E-E, slip op. at 63 (Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights Jan. 29,
1986) (finding "comparable character" when the "evaluated worth of the two posi-
tions is essentially equivalent to the employer").
107. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 68.
109. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1986), quoted supra note 20. The "reason-
able demands of the position" defense is not available in a suit alleging discrimination
based on race, religion, color, or national origin. The Alaska Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the "reasonable demands of the position" defense to allow distinct treatment
on the basis of sex only for "requirements or necessities that are of an urgent nature."
McLean v. State, 583 P.2d 867, 869 (Alaska 1978). The supreme court also held that
the employer has the burden of proving this particular defense by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 869-70.
110. For an example of a case that combined elements of analysis from Title VII
cases and Equal Pay Act cases, see Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 691 F.2d 873,
876 (9th Cir. 1982).
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involving discrimination in pay is Brown v. Wood. 111 In 1965, the Uni-
versity of Alaska hired Greeta Brown as an Assistant Professor of Mu-
sic.112 Brown contended that, before she resigned in 1973,113 she was
paid less, promoted more slowly, and required to work harder than
her male counterparts.' 14 After examining Brown's case on appeal,
the supreme court found insufficient evidence of discrimination in pro-
motions or workload.1 5 The only issue remaining before the court,
therefore, was whether the university had discriminated against
Brown in setting her salary. Brown did not bring suit under the
Human Rights Act, but instead relied on the Alaska Equal Pay for
Women Act which was still in force at that time.116
The Equal Pay for Women Act provided:
No employer may discriminate in the payment of wages as be-
tween the sexes, nor may he employ a female in an occupation in this
state at a salary or wage rate less than the rate paid to a male em-
ployee for work of comparable character or work in the same opera-
tions, business, or type of work in the same locality.' 7
Because the italicized clause of the Equal Pay for Women Act is pre-
ceded by the word "nor," Brown argued that the italicized clause
should be read independently from the first clause. Read indepen-
dently, the italicized clause would allow a female plaintiff to prove
discrimination merely by showing that she was paid less than a man
for comparable work.11
The supreme court rejected this argument, stressing that the legis-
lature, at a minimum, intended that merit or seniority be a defense to a
disparity between the salaries of males and females. 119 The supreme
court held that sex-based considerations would be illegal, but that
wage rates based on other considerations would not violate the Equal
111. 575 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1978), modified, 592 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1979).
112. Id. at 762.
113. Id. at 765.
114. Id. at 762-63.
115. Id. at 768 n.9.
116. Id. at 766. The University of Alaska was not subject to the Human Rights
Act at this time. Id. at 767 n.8; ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(3) (1974) (amended
1980). The legislature expanded the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act to cover
the university at the same time it repealed the Equal Pay for Women Act. Act of June
30, 1980, ch. 125, § 3, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated). Brown also sued the
University of Alaska under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
The supreme court later modified the opinion to hold that the university was within
the jurisdiction of section 1983. Brown v. Wood, 592 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Alaska 1979),
modifying 575 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1978).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.155 (1972) (repealed 1980) (emphasis added). Note
the similarity of the Equal Pay for Women Act with subsection five of the Alaska
Human Rights Act. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (1986), quoted supra at note 20.
118. Brown, 575 P.2d at 768.
119. Id.
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Pay for Women Act. 120 Since Fridriksson defined discriminatory "in-
tent" as a decision based on sex, 121 the statement by the Brown court,
that the law prohibits only sex-based considerations, implies that
Alaska wage discrimination law allows a defense that no intent
existed.
Even after the supreme court allowed a "lack of intent" defense,
Brown prevailed. Brown first established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by showing that "she was paid less than her male col-
leagues for comparable work at the University of Alaska."122 The
university attempted to rebut the prima facie case by offering a nondis-
criminatory reason for paying Brown lower wages. The university
contended that "it could not get funding for the original position of-
fered to Brown and that it drained other resources to create the posi-
tion for her at $9,000 per year." 123
Since Brown did not involve subsection one of the Human Rights
Act, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on federal court interpretations
of the Equal Pay Act rather than Title VII, and determined that the
university bore the burden of proving its defense 124 rather than merely
articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate treatment. 125
The court held that the university failed to prove its nondiscrimina-
tory reason why Brown's salary was consistently lower than her male
counterparts, and that Brown's prima facie case remained unrebut-
ted. 126 Thus, the Brown decision shows the willingness of the Alaska
Supreme Court in interpreting Alaska employment discrimination law
to rely on the analysis developed in other federal laws as well as in
Title VII.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
122. Johnson v. State, 607 P.2d 944, 947 (Alaska 1980) (explaining Brown).
123. Brown, 575 P.2d at 769.
124. Id. at 768-69. In placing the burden on the employer, the Alaska Supreme
Court relied on Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974). The
supreme court added that the employer must meet his burden of proof with clear and
convincing evidence that the decision was based on factors other than sex. Id. at 768
n.1 1 (citing Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th
Cir. 1975) (burden on the employer is a "heavy one"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973
(1976)).
125. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
126. Brown, 575 P.2d at 769. The court indicated that, even if the university had
met its burden, Brown was prepared to respond by presenting evidence that other
women in the music department also received lower wages than men. In such an
event, the court could then determine whether this evidence of a pattern or practice of
discrimination disproved the university's justifications. Id. at 769-70.
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V. GENDER-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ALASKA
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
A. Thomas v. Anchorage Telephone Utility
The Anchorage Telephone Utility is owned by the Municipality
of Anchorage. 127 In 1975, the ATU work force was divided into three
groups: plant forces,128 traffic forces, 129 and commercial and clerical
personnel.' 30 Ninety percent of the plant force personnel were male,
while ninety-five percent of the traffic, commercial, and clerical em-
ployees were female.' 3 ' The International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers represented all of the ATU employees.
In May 1975, the Anchorage Telephone Utility and IBEW rene-
gotiated the ATU employee contract.' 32 IBEW had recently con-
cluded successful negotiations for plant force workers on the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Project.' 33 Construction and maintenance of the com-
munication systems on the pipeline greatly increased the demand for
skilled electrical workers.' 34 IBEW used the high demand for, and
high salaries available to, these skilled craft employees on the pipeline
as leverage in negotiating the contract with ATU. 135 As a result, the
plant forces received a forty-five percent pay raise, while the traffic,
commercial, and clerical personnel received a lesser pay hike.
136
A class of women in the TCC forces sued the Anchorage Tele-
phone Utility as well as the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers for discrimination on the basis of gender. Their complaint
argued both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
liability. Because the work performed by the TCC personnel and the
127. Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 4. In 1975, the Municipality of Anchorage
was still divided into the Greater Anchorage Area Borough and the City of
Anchorage, which at that time owned ATU.
128. Id. The plant forces contained about 300 people, most of whom were journey-
men electricians with four years of training.
129. Id. The traffic forces contained 70 people, most of whom were telephone
operators.
130. Id. The commercial and clerical group contained approximately 25 people,
most of whom were service representatives.
131. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 5. Nationwide, 80% of clerical workers
are women while only 6% of craft workers are female. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, FAcTS ON WOMEN WORKERS 2 (1982).
132. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 4.
133. Brief of Appellee International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union 1547 at 16, Thomas v. Anchorage Tel. Util., No. S-51 (Alaska filed July 7,
1983) [hereinafter Brief of IBEW].
134. Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 5-6.
135. Brief of IBEW, supra note 133, at 9.
136. Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 5.
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plant forces was not comparable,13 7 the equal pay provision of subsec-
tion five of the Human Rights Act did not apply to their action. 13 8
Therefore, the plaintiffs relied on the general prohibitions against dis-
crimination contained in subsection one of the Act. 139
Since subsection five was unavailable, the plaintiffs could not rely
on Brown and establish a prima facie case simply by showing that a
female wage rate was less than a male wage rate for work of compara-
ble character.1 40 The plaintiffs also could not use Brown to place on
ATU the burden of proving that the disparity in pay raises resulted
from a non-sex-based consideration. 14 1 The absence of job compara-
bility restricted the plaintiffs to a disparate treatment theory as set
forth in McDonnell Douglas or a discriminatory impact theory as set
forth in Griggs.
Anchorage Telephone Utility raises several novel issues for Alaska
employment discrimination law. The first issue is whether treating a
male-dominated sector of the work force differently from a female-
dominated sector is the same as treating individual men and women
differently under the Act. The second issue is whether a showing of
similarity or comparability between the jobs is required to establish a
prima facie case. The third issue is whether the employer can justify
different pay raises to male- and female-dominated groups by asserting
that the marketplace valued certain jobs more highly than others. The
fourth issue is whether a market defense requires that the market actu-
ally value the jobs differently or that the employer only believe the
market valued the jobs differently. And the fifth issue of Anchorage
Telephone Utility is what type of facially neutral test the Alaska
Supreme Court should require in order to establish liability under a
disparate impact theory.
B. Establishing A Case Of Disparate Treatment
1. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Hempfield
Township: A Differing Pay Raise May Indicate Intent to Discrimi-
nate. The plaintiffs in Anchorage Telephone Utility have precedent
for a finding of disparate treatment in Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission v. Hempfield Township. 142 In Hempfield Township, a
Pennsylvania court found that the award of a higher wage increase to
male road maintenance employees than to female clerical employees
137. Id. at 4.
138. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (1986), quoted supra note 20.
139. Id. § 18.80.220(a)(1), quoted supra note 20.
140. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
142. 23 Pa. Commw. 351, 352 A.2d 218 (1976). Unlike Anchorage Telephone Util-
ity, Hempfield Township concerned unequal dollar-amount pay raises rather than une-
qual percentage pay increases. Since the average woman earns less than 60% of the
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violated the Pensylvania Human Relations Act. 143 After examining
several of management's derogatory statements about women, the
court held that the difference in pay increases resulted from an intent
to treat women differently.144
It is important to note that, in Hempfield Township, only males
worked in road maintenance and only females held clerical posi-
tions. 145 Thus, every female received a smaller raise than every male.
The discriminatory nature of the different raises was emphasized by
the fact that previous pay increases of road maintenance and clerical
personnel were fairly equal when a male had held a clerical position.
As soon as the male clerical position was eliminated, however, the dif-
ference in annual pay raises between the work groups greatly in-
creased. 146 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decison in Hempfield
Township illustrates that with evidence of intent a case of disparate
treatment among different classes of employees can succeed.
2. Discrimination Against Groups Dominated by Members of a Pro-
tected Class. Although the Hempfield Township decision suggests
that courts can find sex discrimination when exclusively female groups
receive lower pay raises than exclusively male groups, it left unan-
swered questions as to the rights of work groups that are not exclu-
sively female. When one employment sector is composed entirely of
men and another is composed entirely of women, it is relatively easy to
infer that any difference in the treatment of the sectors results from an
intent to treat men and women differently. As more women join the
male-dominated sector of the work force and as more men join the
average man's earnings, WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ON WO-
MEN VORKERS 1 (1982), most women would benefit more from equal dollar-amount
pay increases than equal percentage pay increases.
143. Hempfield Township, 23 Pa. Commw. at 353, 352 A.2d at 219. The Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act is codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon
1964). The Alaska Supreme Court has previously looked to Pennsylvania law for
support in interpreting the Alaska Human Rights Act. See Hotel, Motel, Restaurant,
Constr. Camp Employees, and Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942,
946-47 (Alaska 1976).
144. Hempfield Township, 23 Pa. Commw. at 354-55, 352 A.2d at 220. Some of
the statements were:
"A woman cannot negotiate like a man who has a family to support."
"If you are able to put on overalls and take a shovel and dig a ditch, then
you would get the same as the men."
"[O]ffice girls should not receive as much in pay raises as men since they do
not have families to raise."
Id. There was some conflicting evidence of similar statements having been made by
the defendants in Anchorage Telephone Utility. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at
12-14.
145. Hempfield Township, 23 Pa. Commw. at 353, 352 A.2d at 219.
146. Id. at 356, 352 A.2d at 220-21.
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female-dominated sector, however, the inference of an intent to dis-
criminate lessens.' 47 Thus, as the work groups become more inte-
grated, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish a prima facie case
of disparate treatment.148 At least one federal court has held that a
prima facie case of intentional sex-discrimination cannot be made if
the favored work group is at least thirty-three percent female. 149 Fur-
thermore, once a plaintiff does establish a prima facie case, she faces
an even greater burden of proving that sex was a factor in the
decision.150
Wage rate negotiations that are based on sex so that women re-
ceive less than men clearly violate the law.' 5 ' When negotiations are
based on work groups and the groups, because of integration, are not
perceived as either "male" or "female," it is less likely that the negoti-
ators based their decision on sex and more likely that some other fac-
tor such as market forces determined the differing outcomes. In
Anchorage Telephone Utility, the plant forces were ninety percent male
and the TCC personnel were ninety-five percent female.152 This high
degree of sex-segregation 153 allows an inference of discriminatory in-
tent when the groups are treated differently, and therefore, permits the
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case.
3. Job Comparisons Are Not Required for a Prima Facie
Case. The Supreme Court announced the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie test because the natural inference that results from the rejection
147. Use of the disparate impact theory avoids the need to prove an intent to dis-
criminate. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why the
plaintiffs could not use the disparate impact theory in Anchorage Telephone Utility, see
infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
148. The rationale of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test is that the plaintiff's
establishment of the four parts of the test suggests that discrimination more likely
than not motivated the action. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
149. Beall v. Curtis, 603 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd without published
opinion, 778 F.2d 791 (1lth Cir. 1985). Economic studies often define "men's jobs"
and "women's jobs" as those where at least 70% of the work force is represented by
one sex. See, e.g., American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Wash-
ington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
150. It is intuitively less likely that the employer perceives of TCC workers as "fe-
males" when a larger percentage of men fill that sector of the work force.
151. IBEW stipulated to this conclusion of law. See Brief of IBEW, supra note
133, at 1.
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. Title VII forbids the wrongful segregation of employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). Title VII
also forbids intentionally segregating the work force on the basis of sex and then pay-
ing the female portion of the work force less than the male portion. See Taylor v.
Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981). The plain-
tiffs, however, did not raise the issue of wrongful segregation in Anchorage Telephone
Utility.
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of a qualified minority candidate and the later hiring of a non-minority
candidate is that discrimination motivated the decision. 15 4 Some
lower courts believed that the natural inference from unequal pay for
unequal jobs was that the different requirements of skill, effort, and
responsibility, not a discriminatory motivation, caused the pay differ-
ence.155 These lower courts required that the work performed by
males and females be similar in order for the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case.15 6 The Hempfield Township decision, however, dem-
onstrates that even when male and female employees hold completely
dissimilar jobs, a court may find an intent to discriminate if the em-
ployer treats those men and women differently.157 Alaska must decide
whether to follow the lower federal courts by adding a requirement of
similarity, or comparability, of jobs to the requirements for establish-
ing a prima facie case of disparate treatment under subsection one of
the Human Rights Act.
This note argues that a prima facie case should not include a
showing of comparability, or similarity, of work. First, a requirement
that the plaintiff show comparability would make subsection one's
general prohibitions of discrimination ineffective against the unfair,
category-wide treatment exemplified in Hempfield Township. Second,
adopting such a requirement would ignore the separate histories of
subsections one and five'58 by imposing subsection five's "comparabil-
ity" requirement onto the elements necessary for a suit under subsec-
tion one. Third, the argument for such a requirement rests on the
presumption that the marketplace values the different jobs differ-
ently.159 If the marketplace is responsible for the wage disparity, then
that assertion should be subject to proof. Because the plaintiff is not
likely to be as sophisticated in understanding the market as the em-
ployer, the employer is in a better position to present evidence that the
market truly did influence its decision.1 60 The employer should be re-
quired to assert the market defense as a rebuttal to the plaintiff's
prima facie case. Finally, the prima facie case was not intended to be a
difficult burden for the plaintiff, but rather a simple showing that
forces the defendant to explain its decision-making process.1 61 After
the plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, the defendants have
an opportunity to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the deci-
sion. In Anchorage Telephone Utility, the defendants have claimed
154. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
155. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
159. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 & n.8 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
160. See id. at 446.
161. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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that the marketplace mandated the different pay raises for the male-
and female-dominated jobs. 162
4. Alaska Should Allow a Market Defense in Anchorage Telephone
Utility. In wage discrimination cases under the federal Equal Pay
Act, employers are not permitted to assert their reliance on the market
as a defense. 163 The United States Supreme Court held that under the
Equal Pay Act the fact that "men would not work at the low rates
paid women" did not justify paying women less than men for equal
work. 164 It is uncertain whether in a suit under subsection five of the
Alaska Human Rights Act an employer is precluded from using the
differing values of job skills in the marketplace to justify a wage dis-
parity. Because the Alaska courts rely heavily on federal precedent to
interpret the Human Rights Act, 165 a market defense is probably un-
available under the transplanted Equal Pay for Women Act.
Nevertheless, any defenses that are unavailable in a suit under
subsection five are not necessarily precluded in a suit under subsection
one.166 The general prohibitions against employment discrimination
in subsection one are similar to the prohibitions in Title VII, and the
Alaska courts should look to the federal cases interpreting Title VII
for guidance in interpreting subsection one. The federal courts have
allowed defendants to assert a market defense in cases of sex-based
wage discrimination under Title VII. 167 Because use of a theory of
disparate treatment, as opposed to disparate impact, requires a show-
ing of discriminatory intent,' 68 a defendant is allowed to show that the
market motivated its decision. In Briggs v. City of Madison, 169 a fed-
eral district court explained the rationale for the market defense:
162. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
163. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1975).
164. Id. at 205.
165. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also supra note 124 (explaining
the Alaska Supreme Court's reliance on Corning Glass in deciding Brown v. Wood
under the old Equal Pay for Women Act).
166. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
167. E.g., Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590, 595 (D. Md. 1986);
Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 446-47 (W.D. Wis. 1982); accord Bohm
v. L. B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 370 N.W.2d 901, 905-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that under the Minnesota Human Rights Act reliance on market factors dis-
pels an inference of intentional discrimination when male-dominated group receives a
greater wage increase than female-dominated group); cf. Note, Use of the Market
Wage Rate in Employment Discrimination Suits: Equal Work as the Key to Applica-
tion, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513 (1986) (stating that market defense should be
allowed if the work is unequal, but not allowed where the work is equal).
168. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15
(1977).
169. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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Under Title VII, an employer's liability extends only to its own acts
of discrimination. Nothing in the Act indicates that the employer's
liability extends to conditions of the marketplace which it did not
create. Nothing indicates that it is improper for an employer to pay
the wage rates necessary to compete in the marketplace for qualified
job applicants. That there may be an abundance of applicants quali-
fied for some jobs and a dearth of skilled applicants for other jobs is
not a condition for which a particular employer bears
responsibility. 170
Thus, federal courts recognize that an employer is not liable under a
disparate treatment analysis for wage disparities caused by the laws of
supply and demand. 171 Setting wages according to market rates does
not constitute discrimination under a disparate treatment analysis.
172
Because use of a disparate treatment theory under Alaska dis-
crimination law also requires evidence of intent, 73 the plaintiff's
showing of her employer's profit-making ambition should not be a
substitute for that intent requirement. This is especially obvious in the
case of a disparate pay raise. As supply and demand fluctuate in the
170. Id. at 447.
171. Judge Posner in American Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th
Cir. 1986), stated the economists' view that raising the wages of female-dominated
jobs above the market level would actually be harmful to women:
On the cognitive question economists point out that the ratio of wages
in different jobs is determined by the market rather than by any a priori
conception of relative merit, in just the same way that the ratio of the price
of caviar to the price of cabbage is determined by relative scarcity rather
than relative importance to human welfare. Upsetting the market equilib-
rium by imposing such a conception would have costly consequences, some
of which might undercut the ultimate goals of the comparable worth move-
ment. If the movement should cause wages in traditionally men's jobs to be
depressed below their market level and wages in traditionally women's jobs
to be jacked above their market level, women will have less incentive to enter
traditionally men's fields and more to enter traditionally women's fields.
Analysis cannot stop there, because the change in relative wages will send
men in the same direction: fewer men will enter the traditionally men's jobs,
more the traditionally women's jobs. As a result there will be more room for
women in traditionally men's jobs and at the same time fewer opportunities
for women in traditionally women's jobs-especially since the number of
those jobs will shrink as employers are induced by the higher wage to substi-
tute capital for labor inputs (e.g., more word processors, fewer secretaries).
Labor will be allocated less efficiently; men and women alike may be made
worse off.
Id. at 719-20.
172. See American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Washington,
770 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Amercian Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at
725 (holding that no claim of discrimination is stated if allegation is that employer set
salary according to market rather than worth to employer).
173. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text. But see Fossey, supra note 86,
at 59-63.
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labor market, different jobs will not maintain a constant relative mar-
ket value with respect to each other. If demand, for example, shifts so
that the market value of craft jobs rises momentarily faster than the
value of clerical jobs, then a greater pay raise for the craft workers
than for the clerical personnel will not necessarily suggest an intent to
discriminate on the part of the employer. The Alaska Supreme Court
should not find a violation of the Human Rights Act if an employer
sets wage levels according to the marketplace and not on the basis of
sex.
5. ATU Satisfied the Market Defense. The telephone utility and
IBEW argued that high oil pipeline wages forced them to offer a "pre-
mium" wage to plant force workers. The telephone utility believed
that the "premium" was necessary to prevent plant force workers
from being lured away to work on the pipeline.174 The defendants also
contended that clerical personnel were less likely to be lured away
from their jobs and that even if the clerical personnel did leave, their
jobs would be easier to fill than the jobs of the journeymen
electricians.1 75
Whether the market defense is successful depends largely on who
bears the burden of proof. Under the holding of Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 176 Anchorage Telephone Utility would
only need to articulate the laws of supply and demand as the reason
for the differing pay raises. 177 The burden then would fall on the
plaintiffs to prove that the market's differing wage rates were not the
true reason for ATU's decision.178 The Alaska Supreme Court
adopted the Burdine Court's approach in Alaska USA Federal Credit
Union v. Fridriksson. 179 This means that to succeed under the Alaska
Human Rights Act, the traffic, commercial, and clerical workers in
174. Federal courts have held that if an employer needs to pay extra benefits or
salary to one group of workers in order to retain them, then that fact will rebut an
inference of discriminatory intent. See Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp.
590, 595 (D. Md. 1986); Briggs, 536 F. Supp. at 447.
175. Brief of IBEW, supra note 133, at 18 ("In addition, clerical and sales person-
nel were more readily available to employers because of the large existing pool of
persons seeking such employment and the relatively short periods of training required
to qualify the employee for such work.").
176. 450 U.S. 248 (1981), discussed supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
177. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56.
178. Id. at 256.
179. 642 P.2d 804, 808 (Alaska 1982); see also supra note 91 and accompanying
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Anchorage Telephone Utility must persuade the court by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the market did not motivate ATU to offer
differing pay raises. 180
The plaintiffs must prove that the defendant's articulation of the
market is only a pretextual justification for ATU's decision. It is un-
clear, however, whether in showing pretext the plaintiff must prove
that the market actually did not mandate different wage increases or
that ATU did not believe different wage increases were necessary to
compete in the marketplace. In Anchorage Telephone Utility, the
plaintiffs argued that different wage increases were not needed under
the prevailing market conditions."" The shortcoming of this argu-
ment is that even if the plaintiffs prove through hindsight that the
market did not mandate differing wage increases, ATU at the relevant
time of negotiation still may have believed that the market results were
different. A grossly inaccurate reading of the market, however, does
create an inference that basing the decision on the market was a pre-
text for discrimination.182 That inference can be used to rebut ATU's
articulated reason.183
The plaintiffs in Anchorage Telephone Utility did not try to prove
that the supply of and demand for clerical and plant force personnel
remained unchanged or had changed at the same relevant rates. The
plaintiffs mainly attacked the market evidence presented by ATU1 84 as
insufficient to prove a higher demand for plant force personnel than
180. But see Strand v. Petersburg Pub. Schools, 659 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1983).
Strand is a post-Fridriksson case that casts doubt on Alaska's continuing adherence to
the Burdine standard. In Strand, the majority held that the Alaska State Human
Rights Commission's finding of sex discrimination in the school district's refusal to
hire Strand as a principal was based on "substantial evidence." The majority held that
statistical evidence indicating that no women had been hired as a principal or superin-
tendent in a 25-year period showed a pattern of discrimination. This pattern of dis-
crimination tended to rebut the defendant's articulated reason that Strand was not the
best qualified person for the position. Id. at 1222. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Rabinowitz discounted the statistical evidence as unreliable and argued that the ma-
jority had in reality shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 1224-26 (Rabi-
nowitz, J., dissenting). Whether the Strand opinion signals a clear break from
Burdine by placing the burden of proof on the employer remains to be seen.
181. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 33-34.
182. General economic principles state that an inaccurate prediction of the market
may be fatal in the business world. Companies that do not read the marketplace accu-
rately will either not be able to retain employees of sufficient quality and quantity or
inefficiently waste their resources on labor.
183. The opinion in Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590, 595 (D.
Md. 1986), supports this analysis. The Seville court stated that the employer must
have a "legitimate perception" that the market mandated the decision. The plaintiff
can then conduct a market study to show that, in fact, the market differed from the
defendant's perception.
184. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 24-32.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
for TCC personnel. 185 Because the plaintiffs did notprove that ATU's
market defense was a pretext, the plaintiffs' case of disparate treatment
must fail.
C. Establishing a Case of Disparate Impact.
1. The Market Is an Unsuccessful Defense to a Disparate Impact
Case. While a market defense can be successful in a disparate treat-
ment case because it shows a motivation for wage disparity that is not
based on sex, a market defense is clearly unsuccessful in a disparate
impact case. The disparate impact theory does not require that the
plaintiff show intent or motivation, but only an employer-given,
facially neutral test that disproportionally impacts upon a protected
class. 186 The use of such a discriminatory test is valid only if it is
proven to be a business necessity. 187 Thus, any evidence offered in a
disparate impact case that refutes an intent to discriminate will not
negate liability.
2. Reliance on the Marketplace Is Not a Facially Neutral Test That
Creates Disparate Impact Liability. While reliance on the market's
differing valuations of job skills may not be a defense to disparate im-
pact, neither should such reliance establish liability under disparate
impact. Several recent Title VII cases have addressed allegations that
public employers are liable for paying lower salaries for female-domi-
nated jobs than male-dominated jobs. 188 The plaintiffs in these cases
argued that the public employer's reliance on the market resulted in a
disparate impact on female salaries.189 The federal courts, however,
have consistently held that reliance on the marketplace is not the type
of facially neutral test needed to establish a case of disparate impact:190
A compensation system that is responsive to supply and demand
and other market forces is not the type of specific, clearly delineated
employment policy contemplated by Dothard and Griggs; such a
185. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 33-35.
186. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
188. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); Ameri-
can Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); see also
Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.) (suit brought under
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
189. See American Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 725; American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at
1405; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 705; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 355.
190. See American Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 722-23; American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at
1405-06; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707-08; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 356.
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compensation system, the result of a complex of market forces, does
not constitute a single practice that suffices to support a claim under
disparate impact theory. 191
Some courts have added that an employer's reliance on the market-
place is inherently job-related, 192 because to require an employer to
pay anything other than market wages would impair his ability to
compete. Therefore, even if reliance on the marketplace constitutes a
facially neutral test with a disparate impact, that reliance on the mar-
ketplace could be defended as a business necessity.1 93
3. Disparate Impact Is Unavailable. ATU cannot be found liable
under the disparate impact theory of discrimination because it did not
use a facially neutral tool or test to determine wages. The plaintiffs
did not argue that ATU's reliance on the market was a facially neutral
test;194 instead, they asserted that the collective bargaining process was
the "test" that disproportionately awarded men a higher wage increase
than women.1 95 The collective bargaining process would be severely
undermined if unions and employers could both be subject to liability
every time one group of employees received a less favorable employ-
ment contract than that obtained by another group. This result could
be counterproductive to the women's movement since unionization is
strongly advocated as a way to reduce the gap between male and fe-
male salaries. 196 Statistical studies suggest that non-unionization ex-
plains the male and female earnings gap as effectively as an
occupation's concentration of women workers. 197 Thus, increased
union activity would probably benefit women's salaries and, therefore,
should not be limited by the threat of liability for discrimination under
the disparate impact theory.
Another problem with the plaintiffs' argument that the collective
bargaining process creates liability under disparate impact is the
strong congressional support for collective bargaining. Employers are
191. American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1406 (citations omitted).
192. See Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708.
193. Cf Newman v. Crews, 651 F.2d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
policy that gave a pay raise to grade A but not to grade B and C teachers and had a
disparate impact on black teachers was justified by business necessity because it helped
the school district attract the best qualified teachers).
194. The plaintiffs did argue that IBEW partly established the market through pre-
vious negotiations on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Project, which significantly increased
salaries for skilled craft employees. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 35. If IBEW
created, as well as relied on the market, IBEW cannot avail itself of the analysis of the
Spaulding court, which emphasized that employers are only "price takers" and "deal
with the market as a given." Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708.
195. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 55.
196. See, eg., Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable
Worth, 99 HARV. L. Rav. 1728, 1797-801 (1986).
197. Id. at 1798 (citing statistical studies).
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obligated to bargain with unions over the elimination of race and sex
discrimination in employment. 198 This duty supercedes the require-
ments imposed under Title VII. 199 Thus, Congress has deemed the
policy behind collective bargaining to be important enough to override
the policies underlying Title VII. Because of this strongly expressed
support for collective bargaining, the supremacy clause arguably
would prevent any state law from also burdening the collective bar-
gaining process. 2°° The plaintiffs' only redress is to claim that the
union violated its duty of fair representation 201 and not to claim that
an unfair result creates liability under the disparate impact theory.
Collective bhrgaining is also not a facially neutral test that neces-
sarily brings discriminatory results. Collective bargaining allows em-
ployees to band together and extract higher salaries from their
employer than they could negotiate individually.202 It is a dynamic
process that may or may not award higher pay raises to female-domi-
nated jobs. Collective bargaining contemplates participation through
the representation of all employees and requires the approval of the
majority of those employees. 20 3 Moreover, the collective bargaining
process easily could be justified as a business necessity. Employers
cannot negotiate wage contracts with each employee individually but
are compelled to negotiate with one representative or group of repre-
sentatives. In sum, collective bargaining is not a facially neutral test as
contemplated by the Court in Griggs. An employer should not be sub-
ject to liability if he bargains for wages with representatives of the
group simply because one portion of that group is not as successful.
198. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
199. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 70-73 (1975).
200. But see Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1977) (holding that the
National Labor Relations Act did not preempt the Alaska state courts from deciding
whether the union's requirement that a Seventh-Day Adventist pay union dues was
discrimination on the basis of religion).
201. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (holding that the
Railway Labor Act requires the bargaining agent to represent the minority union
members "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith"); see
also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953) (holding that the same
duty exists under the National Labor Relations Act). Note that the plaintiffs did
make a claim that the union did not fairly represent them. See Brief of Appellants,
supra note 1, at 44-48.
202. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 67-68.
203. Id. at 62.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court can reject the plaintiffs' petition in
Anchorage Telephone Utility, and still stand for a broad anti-discrimi-
nation law. The breadth of Alaska's law is shown in many ways.204
First, Alaska succinctly names and protects almost every minority
group. Second, the Alaska law applies to all employers not just those
that receive federal funds or have a certain number of employees.
Third, the Human Rights Act gives the Alaska State Commission for
Human Rights more tools to combat employment discrimination than
Title VII gives the EEOC. Fourth, the Alaska employment discrimi-
nation law applies extra-territorially. And finally Alaska allows for
broad remedies like affirmative action quotas.
For all of the above reasons the Alaska law can be interpreted as
having more "teeth" than federal law.205 The Alaska Supreme Court
can broaden the Human Rights Act further by allowing a sector of a
work force that is composed predominantly by a protected class to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination when treated differently
from another sector of the same work force even if the work is not
comparable or similar. The supreme court, however, should still re-
quire in a disparate treatment case for sex discrimination that the
plaintiff prove sex was a factor in the decision. The supreme court
should also allow the employer to prove that his actions were a result
of the marketplace and not of an intent to discriminate. Finally, the
Alaska Supreme Court should not broaden Alaska's law by changing
the legal requirements for a disparate impact case and allowing collec-
tive bargaining to be a Griggs-type facially neutral test.
John R. Read
204. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
205. See Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Alaska
1976).

